【by Sana Sakihama, June 2026】
1. Introduction
This paper aims to clarify the characteristics of Okinawa’s cyber right-wingers (net-uyo) by drawing on the concept of “affect.” To do so, it first outlines the historical and political background of Okinawa and introduces the emergence of Okinawan net-uyo. It then reviews previous studies on mainland Japanese net-uyo, focusing particularly on psychoanalytic approaches that explain their practices through the notion of the “theft of enjoyment.” Finally, by comparing Okinawan net-uyo with their mainland counterparts, the paper identifies both their shared characteristics and the features that distinguish the Okinawan case.
2. Historical and Political Background of Okinawa
Until it was annexed as Okinawa Prefecture by the Empire of Japan in 1879, Okinawa existed as the Ryukyu Kingdom, a political entity separated from Japan. It has long been recognized as a region with a distinctive culture, including differences in language and religion, from mainland Japan. Although the process of modernization promoted Japanization and reduced many of these cultural differences, a Ryukyu/Okinawan identity rooted in history continues to exist. This identity is defined not only in cultural terms but also in deeply political ones.
Most notably, the issue concerns the U.S. military bases. Following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, Okinawa remained under American administration until 1972. Moreover, approximately 75 percent of the U.S. military facilities located in Japan are still concentrated in Okinawa. Many Okinawans have therefore regarded this concentration as a form of “structural discrimination” imposed by the Japanese state. Consequently, “Okinawa” has functioned not merely as the name of a local region of Japan but also as an identity representing resistance to political power.
Against this historical, cultural, and political background, a new phenomenon has emerged over roughly the past decade: the rise of Okinawan net-uyo. They became particularly active during the 2010s, and their principal objective has been opposition to the anti-base movement. For example, in 2012, when public opinion in Okinawa increasingly opposed the deployment of the Osprey, a U.S. military transport aircraft that had been criticized for safety concerns, Okinawan net-uyo launched the “Thank You, Osprey” campaign in direct opposition to this public sentiment. They also organized the “Fence Clean Project,” in which ribbons tied to the fences surrounding U.S. military bases by anti-base activists were removed, and the “Heart Clean Project,” through which they expressed gratitude toward U.S. military personnel in response to anti-base demonstrations held at the entrances to military facilities.
These activities extend beyond cyberspace and therefore exceed the conventional image of net-uyo as actors who operate exclusively online. Nevertheless, this characteristic is not unique to Okinawa. Mainland organizations such as Zaitokukai (Zainichi-tokken-o yurusanai-shimin-no-kai, or Citizens’ Association Against Special Privileges for Zainichi Koreans) have likewise combined online activities—including the dissemination of hate speech through websites and social media—with street demonstrations. In this respect, the activities of Okinawan net-uyo can be understood as broadly analogous to those of their mainland counterparts. At the same time, they have actively utilized digital platforms, particularly X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, and YouTube, both to disseminate their political views and to publicize their offline activities.
3. Previous Studies on Mainland Japanese Net-Uyo
To clarify the characteristics of Okinawan net-uyo, it is first necessary to consider previous studies on net-uyo in mainland Japan as a point of comparison. A substantial body of research has already examined mainland net-uyo. In addition to sociological and cultural studies such as Higuchi (2014), Higuchi et al. (2019), Itō (2019), and Tanabe (2019), there are also journalistic accounts of organizations closely associated with net-uyo, including Nippon Kaigi and Zaitokukai (Sugano 2016; Yasuda 2012).
Yasuda’s (2012) pioneering reportage attracted considerable attention by presenting one of the earliest detailed portraits of net-uyo. However, subsequent research has demonstrated that the image depicted there—that of socially marginalized and economically deprived individuals venting their frustrations through hate speech—does not necessarily correspond to reality. Many net-uyo are neither socially excluded nor economically disadvantaged, but instead lead relatively stable everyday lives.
Does this mean that explanations emphasizing personal dissatisfaction or grievance should be abandoned altogether? Recent studies by Matsumoto (2021) and Kawamura and Iwabuchi (2022) suggest otherwise. Rather than focusing on socioeconomic status, these studies explain net-uyo through the psychoanalytic concept of “enjoyment” (jouissance). Although net-uyo are not necessarily deprived in material terms, they nevertheless perceive that the enjoyment to which they are entitled has been stolen by others. This perceived “theft of enjoyment” becomes directed toward those identified as its agents, such as Zainichi Koreans, foreigners, or leftists.
Central to this argument is the relationship among enjoyment, desire, and drive. In psychoanalytic theory, enjoyment refers to a state of complete satisfaction that can never actually be attained. Desire emerges from the pursuit of this unattainable enjoyment and serves as the basis for the formation of the symbolic order and, consequently, of the subject. By contrast, drive emerges when the symbolic order becomes weakened. Under these conditions, the repetitive attempt to attain the unattainable itself becomes pleasurable. According to this interpretation, the psychology of net-uyo is characterized not by the expectation that enjoyment will eventually be recovered, but by the endless repetition of claims that “our enjoyment is being stolen.”
Kawamura and Iwabuchi (2022) further argue that this weakening of the symbolic order is closely related to the development of digital media. Under what Jodi Dean (2010) calls “communicative capitalism,” the circulation of signifiers itself becomes the objective of communication, while stable meaning recedes into the background. This tendency is intensified under “platform capitalism” (Srnicek 2017), where algorithms continuously extract and circulate information that provokes affective responses.
From this perspective, net-uyo discourse is sustained by the circulation of empty signifiers such as “Zainichi” (Zainichi Korean), “Shina-jin” (Mainland Chinese), and “sayoku” (leftist). These terms no longer function primarily as coherent political concepts but rather as affective triggers that are repeatedly exchanged within digital networks. Algorithmically curated tweets, videos, and other online content continually reinforce these affective responses, making the repeated denunciation of those who allegedly “steal enjoyment” an end in itself. Consequently, the repetition of such denunciations becomes a source of enjoyment in its own right.
In this respect, net-uyo differ significantly from conventional conservatives. Although both may share historical revisionist tendencies, Kawamura and Iwabuchi (2022) argue that the process of subject formation differs fundamentally between the two. Whereas the modern national subject presupposes a coherent identity grounded in a stable symbolic order, the digitally mediated neo-nationalist subject is fragmented, inconsistent, and highly responsive to affect generated through digital communication. Lacking a stable basis for identity formation, net-uyo assemble disparate and sometimes contradictory elements into what might best be described as a patchwork of beliefs.
4. Okinawan Net-Uyo in Comparative Perspective
The foregoing discussion provides a framework for examining Okinawan net-uyo. As a starting point, it should be noted that “Okinawa” itself constitutes one of the principal targets of mainland net-uyo. Alongside “Zainichi,” “Shina-jin,” and “foreigners,” Okinawa is frequently represented as an entity that deprives “ordinary Japanese” of their rightful enjoyment. This perception stems from the tendency to equate Okinawa with left-wing politics and anti-Japanese sentiment.
In this regard, previous studies have pointed out that hostility toward “the left” constitutes one of the defining characteristics of net-uyo discourse (Matsutani 2019; Momoki 2021). Terms such as sayoku, busayo (ugly leftists), and payoku (a derogatory online term for leftists) are employed not merely as political labels but as derogatory expressions directed toward those who critically reflect upon the imperialism and colonialism of the former Japanese Empire or who express solidarity with East Asian peoples affected by Japanese imperial expansion. This antagonism toward “the left” is closely connected to the hostility directed at Okinawa.
As discussed in the previous section, Okinawa has long been characterized by a strong anti-base movement rooted in its distinctive historical experience and the continued concentration of U.S. military bases. Consequently, mainland net-uyo often portray Okinawa as an island dominated by sayoku. This image became particularly pronounced following the escalation of tensions surrounding the Senkaku Islands.
Against this background, the principal objective of Okinawan net-uyo has been to oppose the anti-base movement and to demonstrate to mainland conservatives that Okinawa should not simply be equated with left-wing activism. In other words, for Okinawan net-uyo, it is the anti-base movement and the political left that have deprived Okinawa of its proper identity. This position is clearly illustrated by the title of Chinen Akira’s book, Even if You Dislike the Anti-Base Movement, Please Don’t Dislike Okinawa (2017), which explicitly appeals to readers who identify Okinawa itself with anti-base activism.
Okinawan net-uyo have also attempted to revise prevailing interpretations of the Battle of Okinawa. Although memories of massacres committed against Okinawan civilians by the Imperial Japanese Army remain deeply embedded in Okinawan society, they seek to counter what they regard as an excessively one-sided understanding of this history by emphasizing episodes in which Japanese soldiers protected local residents. Their objective is therefore not simply to deny the violence of the Japanese military but to present a more positive image of Japan that can challenge what they perceive as anti-Japanese historical narratives.
This point reveals one of the most significant differences between Okinawan and mainland net-uyo. Whereas mainland net-uyo frequently insist that massacres committed by the Japanese military never occurred, Okinawan net-uyo generally refrain from making such categorical claims. Living within Okinawa, many have relatives or acquaintances who experienced the Battle of Okinawa directly. Consequently, rather than denying these events altogether, they argue that while some Japanese soldiers committed atrocities, others protected Okinawan civilians. One representative Okinawan net-uyo, for example, recounts his grandmother’s memories of watching kamikaze aircraft depart during the Battle of Okinawa. While she appreciated the temporary respite from American attacks that enabled villagers to leave the mountains in search of water, she also remembered praying that the young pilots would no longer sacrifice their lives. Such narratives illustrate the complexity of historical memory that distinguishes Okinawan net-uyo from the more comprehensive historical revisionism often found on the mainland.
A similar tendency can be observed in their attitudes toward the U.S. military. Although they acknowledge that crimes involving U.S. servicemen occur repeatedly, they simultaneously emphasize the existence of “good” servicemen and reject interpretations that portray the military presence in exclusively negative terms. More generally, Okinawan net-uyo present themselves as adopting a “neutral” position, arguing that both anti-base activism and dominant historical narratives oversimplify Okinawa’s past and present.
Nevertheless, this claim to neutrality should not be interpreted as evidence of political detachment. As in the case of mainland net-uyo, Okinawan net-uyo exhibit a strong affective rejection of anti-base activism and of critical perspectives on Japanese imperialism and colonialism. Echoing Abe Shinzō’s slogan of “taking Japan back,” they seek to “take Okinawa back from the left.” At the same time, however, Okinawa’s particular historical experience prevents them from fully embracing the comprehensive historical revisionism characteristic of many mainland net-uyo. Their discourse therefore remains marked by a certain incompleteness or internal contradiction: they cannot entirely deny either the violence of the Japanese military or that of the U.S. military, even while attempting to challenge the dominant narratives surrounding both.
5. Conclusion
This paper has examined the characteristics of Okinawan net-uyo through the concept of affect by comparing them with their mainland counterparts. Previous studies have argued that mainland net-uyo are characterized not simply by economic or social deprivation but by an affective attachment to the repeated assertion that their enjoyment has been “stolen” by others. This process is sustained by the communicative dynamics of digital media, where the circulation of affective signifiers becomes an end in itself.
The analysis suggests that Okinawan net-uyo share many of these characteristics. Like mainland net-uyo, they display a strong affective hostility toward the political left and toward anti-base activism, and they actively utilize digital platforms to disseminate and reinforce these views. Their political practices therefore reflect the same affective dynamics that have been identified in previous studies of Japanese digital nationalism.
At the same time, however, Okinawan net-uyo cannot simply be understood as a regional variant of mainland net-uyo. Because they live within Okinawa’s distinctive historical and political context, they cannot fully embrace the comprehensive historical revisionism often found among mainland net-uyo. Rather than denying the violence committed by either the Japanese military or the U.S. military, they tend to acknowledge such violence while simultaneously emphasizing alternative narratives that present both institutions in a more favorable light. Their discourse is therefore characterized by a persistent tension between historical experience and nationalist identification.
In this sense, the case of Okinawan net-uyo demonstrates that contemporary digital nationalism is shaped not only by the affective dynamics of online communication but also by the historical and political contexts in which those affects are articulated. Examining Okinawan net-uyo from the perspective of affect thus contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the diversity and internal complexity of digital nationalism in contemporary Japan.
AUTHOR
Sana Sakihama is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law, Seikei University, Japan. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Tokyo. Her research focuses on Okinawan studies, modern Japanese intellectual history, postcolonial theory, and political thought. She is the author of Ifa Fuyū no Seiji to Tetsugaku (Politics and Philosophy of Ifa Fuyū, Hosei University Press, 2022) and the contributor of the chapter “Inventing ‘Independence’: A Short Intellectual History of Post-war Okinawa” in A New Approach to Global Studies from the Perspective of Small Nations (Routledge, 2023).
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