【by Ma. Luisa Torres Reyes, June 2025】
Our roundtable session at the 2023 Seoul Conference consisted of members of the Network in Defense of Historical Truth and Academic Freedom (NDHTAF), established in the wake of Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s electoral victory in 2022, and the organization of Filipino historians called Tanggol Kasaysayan (Defend History). NDHTAF is mainly an observatory and clearinghouse that aims to keep the Philippine public informed, vigilant, and actively involved in the face of the challenges that come under authoritarianism especially regarding the exercise of the right to academic freedom. Tanggol Kasaysayan is an organization of Filipino History professors fighting for truth in the history of abuses and corruption during the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and exposing historical distortions. Apart from issuing position papers, Tanggol Kasaysayan and NDHTAF have conducted webinars and conferences on topics geared toward the preservation of historical memory about authoritarianism in the Philippines and the protection of academic freedom.
Needless to say, certain members of both organizations have been publicly red-tagged as communists by the henchmen of former President Rodrigo Duterte and incumbent President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. in government, the military, in newspaper columns, and harassed by trolls on the internet. Key concerns of this Philippine topic for the Critical Asia Archives include the historicizing of authoritarianism in the Philippines in relation to democratic processes and institutions established by the former colonizers, particularly, the US; guarding against attempts at historical revisionism in the country and abroad that distort the past to suit the dynastic and political interest of the Marcoses, the Dutertes, and their allies as well as exposing the facts about human rights abuses committed then and now; and informing the public about the deliberate and systematic use of information technology, and, the social media to conduct widespread disinformation campaigns.
In fact, many democracies even in the West (US, Italy, Hungary, etc) have elected leaders in recent years who are authoritarian in practice because they are perceived to be supportive of the interests of the majority of the electorate. Since in electoral democracies, whoever gets the majority support becomes the legitimate leader, ultimately, it is always a contest for the people’s votes. Indeed, at bottom, that is what has given birth to the Third Reich, Trumpism, and the Marcos-Duterte conjuncture in the Philippines, among many others, constituting, of late, a global pattern of authoritarianism. Therefore, it sometimes seems that democracy is the very flip-side of authoritarianism in one and the same coin.
To frame our discussion, allow me to first outline some essential concepts as they have historically taken shape in the Philippine context.
Authoritarianism is typically marked by a dominant, centralized form of leadership in which rulers concentrate power, dictate public policy, impose decisions unilaterally, and wield considerable influence over both the bureaucracy and the populace, often with little to no accountability. Closely related concepts include fascism and totalitarianism, whether aligned with extreme right-wing or left-wing ideologies. In the Philippine context, shaped by a deeply patriarchal culture and beset by long-standing structural socio-economic issues, the brash, heavy-handed leadership style of former President Rodrigo Duterte exemplifies a pattern of authoritarian rule seen in several Philippine administrations throughout the 20th century and beyond. This kind of strongman leadership is not confined to the presidency; it can also be observed at various levels of government—from barangay captains and small-town mayors to provincial governors and national leaders. Notable figures who have embodied such tendencies include former Presidents Manuel Quezon (1935–1944), Ferdinand Marcos Sr. (1965–1986), Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–2010), and Duterte himself (2016–2022). In sum, authoritarianism, or at least its tendencies, is deeply ingrained in the country’s political landscape, both locally and nationally (a fact emphasized and historicized by colleague Oscar Campomanes in terms of American “colonial democracy” in his “Critical Context” piece).
Throughout the 20th century, authoritarianism in the Philippines has been sustained by several interrelated factors. First, weak political institutions have failed to foster a culture of accountability, from appointed local officials to national offices such as the judiciary and the legislature. Second, deeply entrenched feudal economic structures, such as landlordism and its attendant violence, along with widespread poverty, high unemployment, and systemic corruption across all levels of government, have perpetuated social and political inequality. Third, the concentration of power in the hands of traditional elites (landed families, the big bourgeoisie, and bureaucrat capitalists) has enabled a persistent monopoly of influence in both elective and appointive positions. This is evident, for example, in the 18th Congress under Duterte, where 67% of senators and 74% of House representatives came from political dynasties.
Fourth, anti-democratic kinship systems and feudal values (including machismo, compadrismo, and personalistic loyalties rooted in regional, familial, or ethno-linguistic affiliations: again an American-colonial formation) continue to undermine the development of liberal-democratic traditions and practices. Fifth, the presidency remains disproportionately powerful relative to other democratic institutions like Congress, the judiciary, and political parties, further centralizing authority in the executive branch. Lastly, persistent structural inequities, exacerbated by uneven development at the local, regional, and global levels, remain unaddressed. These have been identified by the Philippine Left since the 1960s as the country’s “basic ills”: semi-feudalism, bureaucrat capitalism, imperialism, and fascism.
During elections, these authoritarian dynamics manifest through the entrenched practice of “guns, goons, and gold,” a strategy employed by ruling political machines to secure victories. Candidates aligned with the incumbent president are often protected not only by private armed groups but also by state security forces, ensuring their dominance even down to the village level.
This phenomenon aligns with what can be described as the Philippines’ long-standing tradition of “colonial and postcolonial democracy,” a form of governance that, in practice, resembles a “para-military democracy.” This includes the blatant disregard for basic human rights, the routine red-tagging of dissenters and critics (including academics and students), and the refusal to adhere to international norms of civilized behavior, echoing the darkest days of the Marcos dictatorship. Historically, the country’s political elites and institutional frameworks have consistently failed to improve the conditions of the majority. As a result, many marginalized communities view our political institutions not as safeguards but as heavy burdens or insuperable hurdles. In this vacuum of trust and effectiveness, authoritarian figures often emerge as so-called “messiahs,” promising redemption through the populist mechanism of the ballot box.
Former President Rodrigo Duterte is a clear example. Despite the brutal toll of his drug war, which claimed (in the most conservative estimate) 30,000 lives, his leadership continued to receive strong public support. For instance, surveys from June 2019 showed a net satisfaction rating of +68 (classified as “Very Good”) by Social Weather Stations (SWS), and 85% trust and performance ratings from Pulse Asia. This popularity was reinforced by a longstanding system of patronage and cronyism, marked by the appointment of trusted allies—including former military and police officers, fraternity brothers from law school, long-time personal aides, and family friends—to key positions in government. Loyalty was often tested and rewarded during elections, further entrenching Duterte’s political network.
Drawing from his decades-long tenure as mayor of Davao City, Duterte transplanted a style of governance rooted in provincial, small-town politics onto the national stage. His administration combined a militarized approach to justice (characterized by arbitrary violence and swift, extrajudicial enforcement) with a highly personalized model of rule reminiscent of a “Mayor-as-President” framework. This approach manifested most starkly during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, where laws and policies were applied with authoritarian arbitrariness and little regard for institutional checks and balances.
In essence, Duterte governed the Philippines as if it were an extension of his local stronghold, treating the nation like a larger version of Davao City. His brand of leadership, marked by bullying rhetoric and misogynistic outbursts, especially against women, revealed a deeply ingrained authoritarianism cloaked in populist appeal. To a greater or a lesser degree, the other authoritarian presidents operated in similar ways as if they were local leaders in their provincial bailiwicks: Quezon in Tayabas, Quezon Macapagal-Arroyo in Lubao, Pampanga, Marcos of Ilocos Norte, and so on and so forth.
One of the key challenges moving forward is to cultivate a more democratic model of political leadership that can replace entrenched authoritarian tendencies. The Philippine experience illustrates how the concentration of power in a single individual has repeatedly led to abuses, widespread suffering, societal divisions, and persistent underdevelopment. Globally, confronting authoritarianism requires a reform agenda that builds broad consensus on urgent issues, identifies achievable policy changes, and strengthens laws that expand access to social services, particularly those that serve marginalized communities.
Crucially, the role of the public sphere must be reexamined, as it plays a central part in shaping public opinion. The electoral victory of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., by his own acknowledgment, was largely made possible by a long-running and highly strategic social media campaign aimed at rehabilitating the family’s image: one that included the deployment of thousands of paid internet trolls over many years. While digital technology was once seen as a potential equalizer for democratic participation and open expression, it has in many ways become a tool for disinformation and polarization, undermining democratic engagement.
In today’s digital age, especially under Web 2.0 and the emerging Web 3.0, regulating social media platforms has become increasingly difficult, particularly in liberal democracies that uphold freedom of expression. Nonetheless, efforts must be made to reinforce institutional safeguards: an independent judiciary, responsible media, and transparent governance systems that can curb the unchecked exercise of power.
Ultimately, democratic elections alone are not enough. They must be bolstered by strong accountability mechanisms, including robust systems of checks and balances, vibrant political parties, engaged and critical citizens, and a dynamic, progressive civil society. These reflections may seem modest or even tentative in the face of such enormous challenges, but they can serve as meaningful starting points for authentic social reforms and deeper citizen political engagements.
AUTHOR
Ma. Luisa Torres Reyes is Scholar-in-Residence and Editor of UNITAS, University of Santo Tomas-Manila, Philippines. Email: [email protected]
REFERENCES
“The May 2022 Elections and the Marcos Restoration: Looking Back and Beyond.” 13 June 2022. Accessed on April 24, 2023. https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/rivera.temy%40gmail.com/FMfcgzGpGTHKVDgwRmBCZvHxJpgfjVCW?projector=1&messagePartId=0.1.
Rivera, Temario C. “The Marcos Dynasty: Its Rise, Fall, and Revival.” Temario C. Rivera. Accessed on May 10, 2023. https://www.academia.edu.